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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to study the frequency of new product in-
troductions in monopoly markets where demand is subject to transitory
saturation. We focus on those types of goods for which consumers pur-
chase at most one unit of each variety, but repeat purchases in the same
product category. The model considers innitely-lived, forward-looking
consumers and rms. We show that the share of potential surplus that
a monopolist is able to appropriate increases with the frequency of intro-
duction of new products and the intensity of transitory saturation. If the
latter is su¢ ciently strong then the rate of introduction of new products
is higher than socially desirable (excessive dynamic product diversity.)
JEL Classication numbers: L12, L13
key words: transitory saturation, product diversity, repeat purchases,
demand cycles
1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to study the frequency of new product introductions
in monopoly markets where demand is subject to transitory saturation. Most
of the attention will be on those types of goods for which consumers tend to
purchase just one unit of a particular variety, but engage in repeat purchases in
the same product category. Examples abound in the general category of leisure
goods: books, music recordings, movies, computer games, concerts, etc. In these
cases the pattern of repeat purchases is closely associated to the rate at which
new varieties are supplied. In this context it is natural to ask whether markets
tend to introduce new varieties too quickly or too slowly with respect to some
e¢ ciency benchmark.
I would like to thank Ricard Gil, Martin Perry, Pasquale Schiraldi, and especially Roberto
Burguet for their useful comments. I am also grateful to the Spanish Ministry of Science and
Innovation (ECO2011-29663), and Generalitat de Catalunya for their 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The literature on product di¤erentiation typically considers the static trade-
o¤ between heterogeneous consumer preferences and the xed cost associated
to the production of each variety. Salop (1979)s circular city model or Chen
and Riordan (2007)s spokes model are popular examples of frameworks where
each consumer is portrayed as buying one unit of a particular variety, and hence
di¤erent varieties appeal to separate consumer groups.1
In many of the markets mentioned above, at some level of aggregation, we
also observe product diversity in the standard sense. But when we focus on
a particular segment of the market (for instance, romantic comedies produced
by large Hollywood studios, or historical novels released by major publishing
houses), we recognize that some consumers tend to purchase the same variety
at a point in time, and that their taste for diversity is mostly expressed over
time as new varieties become sequentially available. In fact, commercialization
and consumption are highly synchronized: most purchases are typically made
right after a new variety is released. A well-known illustration of this pattern is
that approximately 40% of US cinema box o¢ ce revenues are obtained during
the rst week and very few movies generate signicant revenue beyond the sixth
week. One reason is the heavy advertising campaigns leading up to the release
date. A second reason is that consumption externalities play a big role in these
markets, and consumers prefer to purchase a particular variety when aggregate
consumption hits its highest level.2
In this paper we abstract from static product diversity in order to study
in a clean and simple environment the market provision of dynamic product
diversity.3 Thus, the denition of the industry we have in mind involves some
degree of disaggregation. As one would expect, looking at product diversity
from a dynamic perspective brings about new insights and signicantly changes
1Another workhorse model of product di¤erentiation, the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model
(Spence, 1976; and Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), takes a di¤erent strategy and describes consumer
decisions as emanating from a "representative consumer" with a preference for diversity. But
this is only meant as a modeling short-cut rather than as a literal representation of individual
consumer behavior.
2For a useful discussion of common practices and stylized facts in the motion picture
industry, see Corts (2001), Krider and Weinberg (1998), and Einav (2007). On consumption
externalities see, for instance, Becker (1991).
3As explained below, the choice of ignoring static product di¤erentiation forces us to con-
centrate on monopoly markets.
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the trade-o¤s identied in the literature.
We present a dynamic model where both the monopolist and consumers are
innitely-lived and form rational expectations. Consumers are ex-ante identical,
but have random, variety-specic preferences. Each consumer purchases at most
one unit of each variety, and each such purchase a¤ects their willingness to pay
for new varieties. We could generally dene that preferences are subject to
transitory saturation if the utility derived from a new consumption episode
tends to increase with the time elapsed since the last episode. Here we adopt a
simplied version that contributes signicantly to the tractability of the model:
a consumers expected valuation is lower if they did consume the previous variety
in the last period. Thus, the preference cycle lasts for only two periods.
The assumption about ex-ante identical consumers with stochastic, variety-
specic preferences is probably a good representation of these real world markets
where consumers are likely to disagree on their ranking of their favorite vari-
eties. Moreover, it allows us to avoid Coasian price dynamics, typically studied
in the context of durable goods. In fact, when preferences experience transi-
tory saturation, consumption decisions are -in some sense- durable. Thus, in a
hypothetical scenario with ex-ante heterogeneous consumers, right after selling
the good to consumers with relatively high willingness to pay, a monopolist
would face a customer base uniquely composed of individuals with relatively
low willingness to pay, since previous buyers would have depreciated valuations
for some time.
We assume that the cost of introducing a new variety is independent of the
time elapsed since the last variety was introduced. As a result, the frequency of
new product introduction is completely demand-driven; that is, it is exclusively
dependent on how fast consumers can absorb new varieties, and hence on the
intensity of transitory saturation.
We take the degree of product di¤erentiation between two consecutive va-
rieties as exogenously given, and focus exclusively on the speed at which these
predetermined varieties are introduced. This is the main reason why we focus
on monopoly pricing. A full analysis of interrm competition would require us
to consider not only dynamic product di¤erentiation, but as well di¤erentiation
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at a point in time, and hence an explicit analysis of how product characteristics
are sequentially selected by di¤erent rms. These important issues are clearly
relevant, but beyond the scope of this paper.
The main result of the paper is that the frequency at which a monopolist
introduces new varieties may be higher or lower than is socially optimal. Exces-
sive high frequency arises when the impact of transitory saturation is su¢ ciently
strong. Excessive dynamic product variety may coexist with underconsumption.
That is, too many varieties are produced but each variety is purchased by too
few consumers.
The determination of whether dynamic product variety under monopoly is
excessive or insu¢ cient depends on the relative strength of two countervailing
e¤ects. These e¤ects are related to those discussed in the literature. In par-
ticular, the analysis of horizontal product di¤erentiation in static frameworks
has also shown that a monopolist may provide too little or too much product
variety with respect to the social welfare maximizing level (See, for instance,
the intuitive examples discussed in De Meza and Von Ungern-Stenberg, 1982).
There are two e¤ects that work in opposite directions. On the one hand, the
monopolist can only appropriate a fraction of total surplus but must pay the
full cost of producing a new variety. As a result, the monopolist would tend to
underprovide product diversity. On the other hand, product variety allows for
a better price discrimination strategy.4 Thus, greater product variety implies
that the monopolist can appropriate a larger share of total surplus. If the sec-
ond e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong then a monopolist provides an excessive degree
of product diversity.
In our model the two countervailing e¤ects are somewhat analogous. The
appropriability e¤ect is in fact identical to the static model, since in both cases
it has to do with the inability of the monopolist to di¤erentiate between dif-
ferent types of consumers. The countervailing e¤ect can be interpreted as a
particular form of intertemporal price discrimination.5 In our model prices are
4 It is not necessarily the case that more variety implies more price disperssion, in the sense
that di¤erent consumer types are being charged di¤erent prices. What is crucial is that more
variety allows the monopolist to discriminate among di¤erent consumer groups and charge all
of them a higher price.
5 In most cases, like durable goods, or non-durables under customer recognition, intertem-
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constant over time, and hence it is not the case that consumer types pay dif-
ferent prices in di¤erent periods. Instead, the monopolist nds it optimal to
raise the price above the short-run prot maximizing level in order to allow
consumers to recover from previous consumption episodes and thereby increase
future sales. Because of such demand cycle, a monopolist is able to appropriate
a higher share of surplus as the rate of introduction of new products increases.
Hence, as in the static case, whenever the second e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong
then the monopolist is providing too much product variety (i.e., introducing
new products too frequently).
The role of transitory saturation in non-durable goods can also be related to
the e¤ect of depreciation or quality improvements in durable goods; in the sense
that they both induce repeat purchases and generate a negative link between
current demand and past purchases. The frequency of innovations can also
be discussed if quality improvements are introduced.6 There is an extensive
literature analyzing product innovation (quality upgrading) in durable goods.
In line with the results of our paper, it has been shown that a monopolist may
introduce more upgrades than is socially optimal (See, for instance, Waldman,
1993; Choi, 1994; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1998). However, these papers present
two-period models and focus on network externalities and compatibility between
old and new models, and hence their results are hardly comparable with ours.
Perhaps, the model most closely related to ours is Fishman and Rob (2000),
in the sense that they also consider an innite horizon framework and study
how e¢ cient is the frequency of innovations generated under monopoly. A
crucial assumption of their model is that innovations are cumulative. They
show that a monopolist introduces new products too slowly with respect to the
social optimum (at least, in the case of no price discrimination and no planned
obsolescence). The reason is that current innovation e¤orts have a positive
poral price discrimination reduces monopoly prots. In fact, a monopolist would like to
commit not to price discriminate. See, for instance, a recent survey by Armstrong (2006).
In contrast, in our model intertemporal price discrimination increases the share of the total
surplus that a monopolist can appropriate.
6The literature on depreciating durable goods has focused on very di¤erent issues; for
instance, on the role of replacement sales in preventing the Coase conjecture (Bond and
Samuelson, 1984; Driskill, 1997), or the e¤ect of scrapping subsidies (Adda and Cooper,
2000).
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e¤ect on all subsequent models, but consumers are only willing to pay for the
incremental ow of services the current model provides.
Despite of certain similarities with the case of durable goods, our model
focuses on non-durable goods for which consumer preferences are subject to
transitory saturation. Below we discuss to what extent the current framework
can be adapted to deal with durable goods. We argue durability and transi-
tory saturation have a su¢ ciently di¤erent nature, which is reected in distinct
patterns of consumer behavior.
The plan of the paper is as follows: In the next section we present the baseline
model and Section 3 is devoted to the rst best allocation. Section 4 contains the
main results. In this section we study the game under the assumption that the
monopolist can commit up-front to the frequency of new product introductions,
but not to prices. It is shown that there exists a unique equilibrium with
constant prices. If new varieties are introduced in every period, then both
the monopolist and consumers engage in speculative behavior. On the one
hand, consumers become choosier as the option value of waiting is positive: they
anticipate that their current consumption would dampen the expected valuation
of the variety that will be supplied in the next period. On the other hand, the
monopolist nds it optimal to set a price above the level that maximizes short-
run prots. Alternatively, if new varieties are introduced in every other period,
then all intertemporal e¤ects vanish and optimal decisions are static. It turns
out that in the rst scenario the monopolist is able to appropriate a larger share
of the total surplus, which explains why -in some region of parameter values-
the frequency of new product introductions is socially excessive. In Section 5
we study the game in case the monopolist cannot precommit to the frequency of
new product introductions. It is shown that the lack of commitment generates
multiple equilibria and, moreover, the region of parameter values with excessive
product variety is expanded. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss the di¤erences
between transitory saturation and durability, the monopoly game under price
commitment, and the impact of competition in a restricted environment.
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2 The model
We examine an innite horizon model of a non-durable good industry in which
consumer preferences are subject to transitory saturation. We let t index peri-
ods, t = 0; 1; 2; ::.We consider a single, innitely-lived producer who sequentially
supplies di¤erent varieties of the good. In each period the monopolist can intro-
duce a new variety by incurring a xed cost, F: Any amount of the variety can
then be produced at constant marginal cost, which is normalized to 0: Every
time a new variety is introduced the previous variety ceases to be available. The
monopolist chooses both the frequency of introduction of new varieties and their
production level in order to maximize the expected discounted value of prots,
using the discount factor,  2 [0; 1).
There is a mass one of innitely-lived consumers with history-dependent
preferences. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of each variety. Con-
sumer preferences are variety-specic and depend on past consumption. More
specically, if consumer i did not consume a previous variety in period t 1, then
her valuation of the new variety in period t, rit, is a random variable, uniformly
distributed on the interval [0; 1] (distribution NC): Moreover, her valuation in
subsequent periods remains constant, either until she purchases the rst unit of
the variety or a new variety is introduced. However, if consumer i did consume
in period t  1, then rit is a realization of distribution C; such that:
rit =

0, with probability 1  
 U [0; 1] , with probability 
where  2 [0; 1) is a xed parameter: If rit > 0 then this is also her valuation
of (the rst unit of) the variety in subsequent periods. If rit = 0, then in
period t+1 she obtains a realization from distribution NC, which again remains
constant, until a new variety is introduced.
Thus, conditional on not having consumed in period t   1, a consumers
expected valuation of a new variety in period t is 12 : However, if she did consume
in the previous period, her expected valuation is 2 <
1
2 : Thus, a lower value of
parameter  indicates a stronger (negative) e¤ect of past consumption on current
preferences. Note that -for the purpose of tractability- the preference cycle
lasts for two periods. Also, consumers are ex-ante identical but heterogenous
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ex-post. In other words, there is a representative consumer, but given that
decisions are taken after observing their current valuations, at any point in time
the monopolist faces a smooth, downward sloping demand function.
We denote by t the fraction of consumers that in period t obtain a positive
realization of rit. Clearly, t will depend on t 1 and the consumption behavior
in period t  1; in a way that will be specied below. Thus, 0 is one of the ex-
ogenous parameters of the model, but t; for all t > 0; are endogenous variables.
For simplicity, we restrict attention to the case of 0 = 1: This is equivalent to
focusing on the medium and long-run performance of the industry. Considering
an arbitrary value of 0 2 [0; 1] signicantly complicates the analysis and brings
about little additional insights.
An individual obtains a net surplus of rit   pt if she chooses to consume in
period t at a price pt: Otherwise she gets 0: Consumers are innitely-lived and
maximize the expected discounted value of their net surplus, using the same
discount factor, :
For future reference we let z   (1  ), which indicates the intensity of
transitory saturation. Low values of  will have a substantial e¤ect on current
behavior only if consumers are forward looking ( is high).
Thus, the model aims at understanding how the frequency of introduction
of new varieties is determined in markets in which consumers typically pur-
chase a single unit of each variety, but the recent history of purchases a¤ect
the valuation of new varieties (think, for instance, of lms and books).7 Since
consumer preferences are variety-specic, commercialization and consumption
occur simultaneously. Also, note that the model is su¢ ciently abstract so that
the characteristics of subsequent varieties (and therefore the "distance" between
them) is not made explicit. Consequently, alternative interpretations are also
possible. For example, the model can also capture the case of highly perishable
goods (like concerts) that are available exclusively at particular points in time.
Whether or not the goods o¤ered at di¤erent points in time are horizontally dif-
ferentiated is not important in this interpretation. Finally, those markets where
7 In the case of music recordings and computer games consumers typically make a repeated
use of each variety. To the extent that most of these consumption episodes occur right after
the acquisition of the good, then the model can be though of as tting these markets as well.
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essentially the same variety is continuously available but consumers experience
transitory saturation (amusement parks, restaurants, tourist destinations) also
t with our model. Obviously, in this case we cannot discuss the frequency of
introduction of new products.
3 The rst best
An allocation can be described as a pair (t; It) for each period t = 0; 1; 2; ::;
where t = 1 indicates that a new variety has been introduced in period t
(and the xed cost is paid), while t = 0 indicates no new variety. It  [0; 1]
represents the set of values of ri for which individuals consume in a given pe-
riod. In this section we characterize the allocation that maximizes the expected
discounted value of total surplus (prots plus consumer surplus). We start
by examining the optimal consumption pattern conditional on t = 1 for all
t. Next, we consider alternative frequencies of new product introductions and
their associated consumption patterns.
Suppose a new variety is introduced every period. Since marginal costs are
constant, the optimal choice of an individual consumer only depends on her
own realization, rit, and not on the aggregate consumption level. If consumer i
acquires the good then her expected level of utility is rit+ UCt+1; where U
C
t+1 is
the continuation value at the beginning of period t+ 1, before she gets a draw
from distribution C. If she waits (does not consume) then she gets UNCt+1 , where
UNCt+1 is the continuation value at the beginning of period t+ 1, before she gets
a draw from distribution NC: Note that neither UCt+1 nor U
NC
t+1 depend on rit.
Thus, from an e¢ ciency point of view, consumer i should consume if and only
if rit  rt; where
rt = 
 
UNCt+1   UCt+1

(1)
In other words, without loss of generality, we can write It = [rt; 1] : Thus, an
e¢ cient allocation can be described by a sequence of threshold values, frtg1t=0 ;
that maximizes the present value of total surplus:
W0 =
1X
t=0
ttTS (rt) (2)
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where TS (rt) =
R 1
rt
rdr is the expected total surplus per consumer gener-
ated in period t , given the threshold rt. Note that t is determined by past
consumption behavior. More specically, aggregate consumption in period t 1
was (1  rt 1)t 1: A fraction  of these consumers, plus all those who did not
consume, 1   (1  rt 1)t 1; will be able to draw in period t a positive rit:
Therefore, the law of motion of t is:
t = 1  (1  ) (1  rt 1)t 1 (3)
The solution of this optimization problem is characterized in the following
lemma:
Lemma 1 If a new variety is introduced every period, it is e¢ cient that con-
sumers purchase the good if and only if rit  r, where:
r =
1 + z  p1 + 2z
z
In the Appendix we prove the Lemma.
Note that r is an increasing function of z, with r (0) = 0; and r (1) = 2 
p
3: As z increases, consumers become more selective because the opportunity
cost of waiting, 
 
UNC   UC ; also increases.
Since the optimal threshold value is constant over time, the law of motion
becomes:
t = 1  (1  ) (1  r)t 1: (4)
Since 0 < (1  ) (1  r) < 1; then t converges to the steady state value
 = 11+(1 )(1 r) ; following an oscillating trajectory.
Let us now turn to the endogenous determination of the frequency of new
product introduction. All possible optimal trajectories can be identied with the
number of consecutive innovative periods (in which a new variety is introduced),
N , that precede an idle period (no new variety). In other words, for an arbitrary
N , 0 = 1 = ::: = N 1 = 1 and N = 0: As a result, N+1 = 1 and a new
cycle of N consecutive innovative periods commences. In particular, one of
the possible optimal paths consists of introducing a new variety every period
(N =1); which can be called option (1); its associated payo¤can be computed
by rewriting equation (2) using equation (4):
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W1 =
0 +

1 
A
  F
1   =
1
1  

1
A
  F

(5)
where A = 1+z(1 r
)
R(r) : Note that A
 increases with z:
A second possible trajectory consists of introducing a new variety every other
period (N = 1), starting with period 0; i.e.; t = 1 if and only if t = 0; 2; 4; ::: In
this case, in all subsequent innovative periods t = 1; independently of current
consumption decisions. The value of waiting is 0 and consequently it is e¢ cient
to let agents consume, provided ri  0: The expected payo¤ of option (1) is:
W 1 = 0R (0)  F + 
2
1  2 (R (0)  F ) =
1  2F
2
 
1  2 (6)
In the Appendix we prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 If F < 12 ; in a rst best allocation either a new variety is introduced
every period (N =1) or every other period (N = 1) :
Thus, the rst best can be determined by simply comparing equations (5)
and (6). If we let F  = 1
 
1+
A   12

then:
Proposition 3 The rst best allocation consists of: (i) Introducing a new va-
riety every period (t = 1 for all t  0) and letting all agents with rit  r con-
sume, if F 2 [0; F ] ; (ii) Introducing a new variety every other period (t = 1
if and only if t = 0; 2; 4; :::) and letting all agents with rit  0 consume, if
F 2 F ; 12 :
4 The frequency of new product introductions
under commitment
This is a model where expectations matter and, as a result, the monopoly so-
lution is time inconsistent. Moreover, there may exist multiple equilibria. In
this section we examine the case where the monopolist can choose up-front the
frequency of new product introduction, but the prices of future varieties cannot
be predetermined. In the next section, we further restrict the ability of the
monopolist to commit to future production plans. In Section 6 we comment on,
among other things, monopoly pricing under full commitment.
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At time 0 we let the monopolist select the entire production plan t 2 f0; 1g.
In those periods in which a new variety is introduced, the rm sets the price
of the variety, pt; and it remains valid until the next variety is introduced:
After observing the availability of a new variety, its price, pt, and their own
realizations, rit, consumers decide whether or not to consume. We restrict
attention to Markov strategies; that is, monopoly price depends exclusively
on t, and consumer decisions depend on t and pt. Moreover, we focus on
perfect Markov equilibria where prices (and consumer behavior) are constant
over time. That is, along the equilibrium path, pt = p; and hence rt = r: Note
that in this type of equilibrium consumers do not have any incentives to delay
the purchase of a particular variety since preferences are variety-specic and
prices are constant. Hence, commercialization and consumption are perfectly
synchronized.
It will be useful to start analyzing the case in which a new variety is intro-
duced every period.
4.1 Preliminaries: a new variety is introduced every pe-
riod
Suppose t = 1 for all t: In this case, the strategies of the rm and consumers
can be written as p (t) = pm and r (pt; t) = f (pt) ; respectively. We will
denote by rm the threshold value along the equilibrium path, i.e., , rm = f(pm):
In equilibrium, pm is the price that maximizes the expected value of prots,
under the beliefs that consumers behave according to r (pt; t) = f (pt) and that
(pm; rm) will prevail in the future, and r (pt; t) = f (pt) describes consumers
optimal behavior under the beliefs that (pm; rm) will prevail in the future.
Consumer decisions
If a consumer with rit purchases the good then her payo¤ is rit pt+ UCt+1;
otherwise she obtains UNCt+1 : Along a constant price equilibrium, U
NC
t+1 and U
C
t+1
are independent of pt and constant over time. Thus, for all t :
rt = f (pt) = pt + 
 
UNC   UC (7)
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Note that @rt@pt = 1: Consumers compare the instantaneous utility from con-
sumption, rt   pt; with the option value of waiting, 
 
UNC   UC, and hence
purchase if and only if rit is su¢ ciently higher than pt: In fact, along a constant
price equilibrium we have that:
UNC = CS (r; p) + (1  r) UC + rUNC
UC = CS (r; p) +  (1  r) UC + (r + 1  ) UNC
where CS (r; p)  R 1
r
(r   p) dr is the per period expected consumer surplus
for an individual that did not consume in the previous period. If we solve these
two equations for UNC  UC , and substitute this value in equation (7) then we
have:
rt = f (pt) = pt +
zCS (r; p)
1 + z (1  r) (8)
If we evaluate this expression at rt = r; and pt = p, we derive one of the two
equations that characterize a constant price equilibrium:
p = r [1 + z (1  r)]  z
2
 
1  r2 (9)
Note that r increases with p; and if p = 0 then r = r: Unsurprisingly, if the
price is above marginal cost, then there is underconsumption.
Firms optimal pricing
In period t the monopolists payo¤ is:
(t) = argmax
pt
t [1  f (pt)] pt   F + (t+1)
where f (pt) is given by equation (9) ; (t+1) is the continuation value at
the beginning of period t+ 1; and t+1 is:
t+1 = 1  (1  ) (1  rt)t
Note that @t+1@rt = (1  )t; and
@t+1
@t
=   (1  ) (1  r) :
In a constant price equilibrium () must be a linear function of ; i.e.,
d(t+1)
dt+1
 k, which is independent of t: Then, the rst order condition of the
rms optimization problem (the second order condition is satised) is:
(1  rt   pt) + kz = 0 (10)
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The rst important observation to make is that the optimal pt does not
depend on t; which is consistent with the existence of a constant price equi-
librium. The second observation is that transitory saturation induces the rm
to set a price above the level that maximizes current prots. In other words, if
the rm increases its price slightly above the level that maximizes static prots,
it causes a second order loss on current prots but it raises future prots (rst
order e¤ect) by increasing demand in the next period (provided k > 0).
By the envelop theorem, if we evaluate (t) at the constant price equilib-
rium then:
k =
d(t)
dt
= (1  r) p  kz (1  r)
Hence, k is independent of t: Solving for k and substituting the value in
equation (10) we obtain:
pt = (1  rt) + z (1  r) p
1 + z (1  r) (11)
If we evaluate this expression at rt = r; and pt = p, we derive the second
equation that determines a constant price equilibrium:
p = (1  r) [1 + z (1  r)] (12)
Equilibrium
Equations (9) and (12) uniquely determine the equilibrium values of (pm; rm) :
rm =
2 + 3z  p4 + 6z
3z
(13)
pm =
2 + 6z  p4 + 6z
9z
(14)
The red lines in Figure 1 depict, on the one hand, the locus describing op-
timal consumer choices (equation 9) and, on the other, the optimal monopoly
prices (equation 12), in the case z = 0. Similarly, the blue lines correspond to
the case z = 1: Note that rm is an increasing function of z; with rm (z = 0) = 12 ;
and rm (z = 1) = 5 
p
10
3 :Graphically, the e¤ect of z on r
m is the result repre-
sented by both blue lines shifting towards the right and thus reinforcing each
other. However, the e¤ect of z on pm is apparently ambiguous since it is the net
result of two countervailing e¤ects: consumer behavior tends to reduce prices
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(demand function shifts downwards due to consumers speculative behavior,
which reduces the price that maximizes current prots), but the monopolist
nds it optimal to raise the price above the level that maximizes current prof-
its. Algebraically, we can see that pm is also an increasing function of z, with
pm (z = 0) = 12 and p
m (z = 1) = 8 
p
10
9 : Finally, r
m (z) > r (z) :
We can further analyze the e¤ect of z on pm by examining equations (8)
and (11) : The departure from the static optimal consumer behavior, zCS(r;p)1+z(1 r) ,
is a proportion of static consumer surplus. Similarly, the departure from the
static monopoly price, z(1 r)p1+z(1 r) ; is the same proportion of static prots. In fact,
combining these two equations we can write:
p =
1
2

1 +
z
1 + z (1  r) [(1  r) p  CS (r; p)]

Since monopoly prots are higher than consumer surplus, prices are above
the equilibrium level of the static game. Thus, on the one hand, we can an-
ticipate than in an oligopoly model (with lower equilibrium prices and hence
higher consumer surplus and lower prots) the net e¤ect is likely to have the
opposite sign, and equilibrium prices may turn out to be lower than in the static
game. However, on the other hand, the presence of myopic consumers would
reduce the impact of transitory saturation on consumer behavior and reinforce
the positive e¤ect on equilibrium prices.
Summarizing, if production takes place every period, N = 1, then equilib-
rium prices and consumer behavior (pm; rm) are given by equations (13) and
(14) : Hence, the present value of prots can be written as:
1 (0) =
0 +

1 
Am
  F
1   =
1
1  

1
Am
  F

(15)
where Am = 1+z(1 r
m)
(1 rm)pm :
We can now compare monopoly prots with potential surplus (gross of xed
costs). This ratio is equal to A

Am : The analysis of this ratio provides us with the
following result:
Remark 4 The ratio of prots to potential surplus is increasing in z and takes
values in the interval [0:5; 0:56] :
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4.2 The optimal monopoly plan
Let us now consider alternative patterns of new product introductions. Us-
ing the labels introduced in Section 3, option (1) consists of introducing new
varieties in periods t = 0; 2; 4; :: In this case, both the rms and consumers
optimization problems become static. Consumers anticipate that in the next
innovative period they will draw their ri from distribution NC independently
of their current behavior; hence they purchase the good if and only if rit  pt.
Similarly, the monopolist anticipates that demand in the next production pe-
riod is independent of current prices; hence she sets the current price in order to
maximize static prots. As a result, rt = pt = 12 (prots per production period
are equal to t 14   F ) and the rms payo¤ is given by:
1 (0) = 0
1
4
  F + 
2
1  2

1
4
  F

=
1
1  2

1
4
  F

(16)
The following Lemma indicates that there is no need to consider any other
production plan (the proof can be found in the Appendix):
Lemma 5 If F < 14 ; then the monopolist nds it optimal to introduce new
products every period (N =1) or every other period (N = 1).
Therefore, the optimal frequency of new product introductions can be char-
acterized by comparing equations (15) and (16) : If we let Fm = 1
 
1+
Am   14

we can state the following result:
Proposition 6 If the rm can choose in period 0 the frequency of introduction
of new products, there is a generically unique constant price equilibria, that
consists of: (i) new varieties are introduced every period, and sold at a price pm
to consumers with ri  rm, if F 2 [0; Fm] ; and (ii) new varieties are introduced
every other period, sold at a price 12 to consumers with ri  12 , if F 2

Fm; 14

:
In order to asses the e¢ ciency of the frequency of new product introduction
chosen by a monopolist, we simply need to compare F  and Fm: Suppose  is
close to zero. In this case, F  is close to 12 and F
m is close to 14 . Therefore,
F  > Fm: In this case, monopoly power tends to slow down the rate of new
product introduction with respect to the rst best. However, if  = 0, as 
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goes to 1; then F  goes to 0:0360 and Fm goes to 0:0502. That is, if transitory
saturation is su¢ ciently strong (z su¢ ciently close to 1), then F  < Fm. In
this case, a monopolist tends to introduce new products too often with respect
to the rst best. Summarizing:
Remark 7 Under commitment, the frequency of introduction of new varieties
can be higher or lower than in the rst best. In particular, new varieties are
introduced too frequently when transitory saturation is su¢ ciently strong.
Monopoly power causes two types of ine¢ ciency. First, the static price dis-
tortion leads to underconsumption whenever a new variety is available. Second,
the frequency of new product introduction is typically ine¢ cient, although its
sign is ambiguous. To explain this ambiguity it is helpful to consider an scenario
where the monopolist is able to appropriate a fraction  of potential surplus un-
der all circumstances. With respect to the rst best, the payo¤ di¤erential
between the two alternative frequencies (gross of xed costs) is scaled down
by ; but nevertheless it has to incur the entire xed cost. In this case, the
rms limited ability to appropriate surplus tends to slow down the frequency
of production. However, under transitory saturation the fraction of the surplus
appropriated by the monopolist varies with the frequency of production. If a
new variety is introduced every other period (and r = p = 12 ) then the monop-
olist captures one half of potential surplus (gross of xed costs). However, if a
new product is introduced every period then the fraction of potential surplus
captured by the monopolist exceeds one half.8 The reason is that a forward-
looking monopolist can make higher prots by raising a new products price
above the short-run prot maximizing level, letting consumersvaluations for
it grow and capture the surplus in the next period at a higher price. It is true
that consumers also become more selective and only purchase the good if the
current surplus is su¢ ciently high. However, this form of consumer speculation
also takes place in the rst best. Moreover, the monopolist sets a price above
marginal costs, which reduces consumersvalue of waiting (reduces UNC UC),
as well as the gap, r   p. As consumers become less defensive the rm can
8See Remark 4.
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capture a higher fraction of total surplus. Thus, if the impact of transitory
saturation is su¢ ciently strong, the monopolist nds it optimal to introduce
new varieties faster than in the rst best, even though it sells them to too few
consumers. In other words, excessive product variety may actually coexist with
underconsumption.
5 The frequency of new product introductions
without commitment
It was convenient in the prior section to assume the monopolist can choose
in period 0 the frequency of new product introductions for the entire game.
This assumption about the rms commitment power may be unrealistic, and
this section will examine the consequences of relaxing it. In the absence of
commitment, in period t the rm chooses t, and if t = 1 then also sets
the price of the new variety, pt: Consumer behavior is qualitatively the same,
although in this case consumers must form expectations about the future pattern
of new product introductions. The central role of expectations opens the door
to multiplicity of equilibria, at least for some key parameter values. Also, it
turns out that without commitment the set of values of the xed cost for which
the equilibrium frequency of new product introduction is socially excessive is
larger than in the case of commitment. To illustrate these claims we focus on
the particular case of  = 0 and  = 1, i.e., z = 1:
Type I equilibrium
Consider a particular strategy prole that supports an introduction of a new
product in every period. The rms strategy is:
If t 2 [; 1] ; t (t) = 1; pt (t) = pm;
If t 2 [0; ) ; t = 0
Let us dene by p (t) the price such that, given the optimal consumer
reaction, it induces t+1 = : That is, for any pt  p (t) then it is rational to
expect that t+1  : Thus, consumersoptimal response to the rms strategy
is given by:
r (pt; t) =

pt +; if pt  p (t)
pt; otherwise
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where p (t) = 1      1 t , and   rm   pm =
4+3z p4+6z
9z = 0:07505:
Such strategy proles will form an equilibrium under some parameter values
(See Appendix for details):
 Result 1: A type I equilibrium exists if and only if F  0:0669:
Type II equilibrium
Consider now a strategy prole that supports an introduction of a new prod-
uct every other period. The rms strategy is:8<: If t 2 [; 1] ; t (t) = 1; pt (t) =
1
2 ;
If t 2 (; ) , t (t) = 1; pt (t) = 58 ;
If t 2 [0; ] ; t = 0
Given such a strategy prole, optimal consumer behavior for all possible
prices and values of t is more complicated that in the case of type I equilibria.
Further details and the analysis of possible deviations are given in the Appendix,
where it is shown that:9
 Result 2: A type II equilibrium exists if and only if F 2 (0:0562; 0:0750) :
Remark 8 If F 2 (0:0562; 0:0669) both type I and type II equilibria exist.
Let us provide some intuition about the multiplicity of equilibria. Suppose
t = 1: If both the rm and consumers expect that new products will be in-
troduced every period, then consumers nd it optimal to purchase only if their
current net surplus is su¢ ciently high (higher than ), and rms prefer to set
a relatively high price
 
pm > 12

: As a result, sales are relatively low, and t+1
turns out to be relatively high. Consequently, the rm nds it optimal to intro-
duce a new variety in period t+ 1, given the high level of demand. In contrast,
if consumers and the rm expect that t+1 = 0; then consumers purchase the
new variety even if the current surplus is arbitrarily low, but positive, and the
rm prefers to set a relatively low price
 
1
2

. As a result, sales are abundant
and t+1 turns out to be low. Consequently, the rm prefers not to introduce
a new variety in period t+ 1, given the relatively low state of demand.
9 If F > 0:0651 there exists another type of equilibrium that supports an introduction of a
new product every other period.
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When both types of equilibrium exist it may be interesting to learn which
is preferred. In the case  = 0 and  = 1 the payo¤s per period for each type of
equilibrium are given in the following table.
Type I equilibrium Type II equilibrium
Prots 0:1501  F 0:125  F2
Consumer surplus 0:0750 0:0625
Total surplus 0:2251  F 0:1875  F2
Thus, consumers always prefer the type I equilibrium in spite of higher prices,
since the good is continuously available. In contrast, the rm prefers the type
I equilibrium if and only if F  0:0502: Finally, a utilitarian social planner
always prefers the type I equilibrium: Thus, when both types of equilibrium
exist there is a conict of interest, and consumers and the rm disagree about
which equilibrium they should play. Also, a second best policy that can only
dictate the frequency of new product introduction, but cannot avoid monopoly
pricing, would only intervene to break an equilibrium where new products are
introduced every other period. In other words, from a second best point of view
new products may be introduced too slowly, but never too quickly.
6 Discussion
6.1 Transitory saturation and durability
As discussed in the introduction, the pattern of repeat purchases of non-durable
goods subject to transitory saturation exhibits some common features with the
case of durable goods subject to either depreciation or quality improvements.
In all these cases, a current customer is less likely to purchase again in the near
future. We need now to address the question: To what extent can the above
model also be interpreted as a model of durable goods.
First of all, some features of the model, especially the assumption that con-
sumer preferences are variety-specic, may be a good approximation in markets
for most leisure goods, but may be less so in the case of most durable goods.
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Even if we keep the random structure of individual consumer preferences un-
challenged, there are important di¤erences in the determinants of consumer
behavior depending on whether the good is durable or non-durable, but subject
to transitory saturation.
Lets rst focus on the case of durable goods that depreciate over time, but
where no quality improvements are introduced. By denition we cannot discuss
the frequency of new product introductions, but we can still discuss other issues
-like the endogenous determination of durability. Suppose that in each period
the utility that consumer i obtains from the use of the good, rit, is an i.i.d.
random variable uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1] : A good lasts a
second period with probability 1    2 [0; 1] : Thus, 1    is also an index
of durability. Let us now examine consumersdecisions. If we let U be the
continuation value in case the consumer does not own a working unit, then it is
optimal to purchase the good if and only if:
rit   pt + 

(1  )

1
2
+ U

+ U

 U
That is, if and only if rit  rt; which is:
rt = pt    (1  ) 1
2
+ (1  ) (1  ) U
Thus, as in the case of non-durable goods subject to transitory saturation,
consumers purchase the good only if the "short-run" surplus, rit+ (1  ) 12 pt,
is above a certain threshold, (1  ) (1  ) U. However, it is important to
note that such a threshold goes to 0 as  approaches 1. In other words, if
the short-run surplus is arbitrarily small, then consumers are not willing to
purchase the good simply because it would delay (in expected terms) the gains
derived from future purchases. Hence, this is su¢ ciently di¤erent from the
above model (equation (7)) where the value of waiting is the di¤erence between
two alternative continuation values, and such di¤erence does not vanish (just
the opposite, it grows) as consumers become innitely patient.
Consider now the case of durable goods that do not depreciate, but where
suppliers can introduce quality improvements. In this case, consumersrandom
preferences imply that at a point in time there are di¤erent consumers groups,
and consumers in each own a unit of a di¤erent age. Thus, the dimension of
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the vector of state variables grows over time, and the tractability of the model
comes into question.
In any case, the analogy between durable goods and non-durables subject
to transitory saturation is worth exploring in future work.
6.2 Price commitment
In case where the monopolist introduces new products every other period, then
future prices play no role in current consumers decisions. As a result, the
ability to commit to future prices is worthless. However, when new products
are introduced every period, then commitment power ceases to be redundant.
In fact, with respect to the time consistent equilibrium characterized above,
the rm would like to commit to higher future prices. The reason is that a
deviation in future prices around the optimal level has a second order e¤ect on
future prots, but as well has a rst order e¤ect on current prots, since the
expectation of higher future prices reduces consumersvalue of waiting, which
in turn increases current demand.
As a result, the ability of committing to future prices enhances the monopo-
lists capacity to appropriate surplus, and this expands the range of parameter
values under which the frequency of new product introductions is socially ex-
cessive (with respect to the rst best).
6.3 Competition
As mentioned in the introduction a full-edged analysis of competition requires
an explicit consideration of the characteristics of all the products supplied at
di¤erent points in time. Such a demanding task is left for future research. In
some sense, the goal would be to embed the substitutability between consump-
tion in di¤erent periods outlined in this paper with the static substitutability
of standard models of product di¤erentiation.
Here we can o¤er some hints of the e¤ects of competition in the extreme
case that static substitutability becomes arbitrary large. In other words, sup-
pose that we allow for more than one rm in our framework, but all rms are
constrained to produce the same variety in a given period of time. In other
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words, if more than one rm decides to enter the market in a given period (and
pay the xed cost) then they would be o¤ering perfect substitutes, which would
drive prices down to marginal cost. Hence, all active rms would be making
negative prots in that particular period. In this scenario, interrm competition
would essentially become a game of timing.
It is possible to read o¤ from this context the following results. First, in the
absence of implicit or explicit coordination, rms should be expected to take
production decisions simultaneously and play mixed strategies. In other words,
in the unique symmetric Markov equilibrium, each rm enters the market in a
given period with a probability lower than one. As a result, the number of active
rms in any period is a random variable. Actually, the lack of coordination is
likely to hurt consumers since, despite the ercer price competition, in some
periods no new variety will be introduced.
Second, in this context it is natural to think of the existence of some coordi-
nating device. In order to x ideas, consider a duopoly and suppose that the two
rms have implicitly agreed on the timing of production, with one of the rms
producing in even periods and the other in odd periods. Such an agreement is
self-enforcing for a large set of parameter values. In this case, each active rm
is in e¤ect a transitory monopolist, but the existence of the rival rm will a¤ect
prices through the intertemporal demand e¤ect. Let us examine the existence
of equilibria in which a new variety is introduced every period and prices are
constant over time.
If consumers expect that a new variety will be available every period, then
their behavior is fully characterized by equation (9) : In short, rd = p + d.
Lets now look closely at the problem of the rm that introduces a new product
in period t. Such a rm sets a price pt in order to maximize:
(t) = argmax
pt
t (1  rt) pt   F + 2(t+2)
where (t+2) is the continuation value at the beginning of period t + 2,
precisely when this rm will be called to produce again. Since along the
equilibrium path we have
 
rd; pd

; then t+2 = 1   (1  )
 
1  rdt+1 =
1  (1  )  1  rd+ (1  )2  1 d   ptt: Note that, in this case, the in-
tertemporal demand e¤ect works in the opposite direction than in the monopoly
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case. Now a rm nds it optimal to set a price below the level that maximizes
current prots, since a lower pt implies a lower t+1 (which generates a nega-
tive externality to the rival rm), which in turn implies a higher t+2; that is,
a larger customer base in the next production period.
Thus, following the same procedure used above we can characterize the con-
stant price equilibrium
 
pd; rd

and check that pd < pm; rd < rm. In other
words, even though rms are transitory monopolist, they still compete intertem-
porally and as a result they set lower prices.
Finally, note that for a large set of values of F rms will indeed have
incentives to introduce a new product every period. In particular, suppose
 = 0 and  = 1: Along the equilibrium path the lowest value of  is 1 =
1  (1  )  1  rd. If a rm deviates at 1 and does not produce in period 1,
then in period 3 (its next production period) 3 = 1. Hence, a deviation is
not protable if (1)  0: In other words, provided F is below the long-run
prot ow, then an equilibrium with production every period does exist. Thus,
competition would tend to reinforce the tendency towards excessively frequent
introduction of new varieties.
Third, there is the issue of the benets of coordination in the context of
xed prices. It is well known that in some markets prices respond very little to
current market conditions. This is the case, for instance in the movie-theatre
industry (Orbach and Einav, 2007). It is easy to check that in a duopoly model
with an exogenous price there exists two types of equilibria: one where each
rm plays a mixed strategy and the other where the two rms alternate in
production. In this case, the social value of coordination (moving from the
rst to the second type of equilibrium) is clearly positive. On the one hand,
rms benet because they avoid the duplication of xed costs and jump from a
zero expected prot equilibrium to one with generically positive prots. On the
other hand, consumers also benet because they avoid the coordination failure
consisting of not having the product available in some periods.
It is precisely in the movie theatre industry where major Hollywood studios
seem to continuously play a game of timing with the releases of their close
substitutes. Einav (2009) has shown that box o¢ ce revenues would increase if
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distributors did not cluster their releases so much. In a similar vein, Corts (2001)
has shown that when two similar lms are both jointly produced and distributed,
then they are released further apart than in the case they have neither a producer
nor a distributor in common. This suggests integrated structures internalize
negative externalities and set schedules in order to maximize joint prots. By
spreading opening times more evenly they are able to increase total demand and
prots. One reason that might explain why the timing of releases is important
(extensively discussed in this empirical literature) is the sharp seasonality of US
demand for movies exhibited in theatres. That is, the optimal release date must
trade o¤ the benets from releasing the movie when demand is at its peak with
the costs of doing it close to a rival movie. A second possible reason behind the
timing game, which empirical researchers may want to consider in the future, is
transitory saturation. If the second reason turns out to be su¢ ciently relevant
then, according to our discussion, coordination and information sharing are
likely to benet not only producers but also consumers.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We apply Bellmans principle: choose rt in order to maximize:
W (t) =
t
2
 
1  r2t
  F + W (t+1)
The rst order condition of an interior solution (second order condition
holds) is:
rt = zW
0 (t+1) (17)
By the envelop theorem:
W 0 (t) =
1
2
 
1  r2t
  zW 0 (t+1) (1  rt)
Combining the two previous equations we can write:
W 0 (t) =
1
2
(1  rt)2
Hence, the optimal policy must satisfy:
rt 1 =
z
2
(1  rt)2 (18)
The stationary solution of this di¤erence equation is:
r =
1 + z  p1 + 2z
z
All the trajectories except r0 = r are explosive, and hence the unique
solution to the optimization problem is rt = r:
8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Since 0 = 1 then it is obvious that 0 = 1: Let us now consider an arbitrary
value of N; 1 > N > 1: Since, N+1 = 1, from equation (17)) this implies that
rN 1 = 0 and rt is obtained recursively from equation (18) for 0  t  N   2.
Also, note that since 0 = 1;then 0 < t < 1 for 0 < t  N   1:
First of all, we show that for any N; 1 > N > 1, dWN (0)d0 2
 
0; 12

: In
period t; 0  t  N   2; we have:
W (t) = tR (rt)  F + W (t+1)
where t+1 = 1  (1  ) (1  rt)t: Hence,
dW (t)
dt
= R (rt)  z (1  rt) dW (t+1)
dt+1
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Let us consider the case t = N   1. In this case dW (N )dN = 0; since there is
no production in period N: Moreover, rN 1 = 0. As a result,
dW (N 1)
dN 1
= 12 :
For an arbitrary t; 0  t  N   2, if dW (t+1)dt+1  0;
dW (t)
dt
< R (rt)  12 : Finally,
if dW (t+1)dt+1  12 ;
dW (t)
dt
> 0.
Suppose that in period 0 it is optimal to follow option N; 1 > N > 1: This
implies that in period N   1 option 1 is preferred to option N: That is,
W 1 (N 1) WN (N 1)
where N 1 < 1: Then since 12 =
dW 1(N 1)
dN 1
> dW
N (N 1)
dN 1
; it must be the
case that:
W 1 (1) WN (1)
And we reach a contradiction. Therefore, at 0 = 1; the only optimal options
are N = 1; and N =1:
8.3 Proof of Lemma 5
The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 2. Applying Bellmans principle:
(t) = argmax
pt
ft (1  rt) pt   F + (t+1)g
where t+1 = 1   (1  ) (1  rt)t, and rt is a linear function of pt with
slope equal to 1:
From the rst order condition of this optimization problem, we obtain:
pt = 1  rt + z0 (t+1)
Using the envelop theorem:
0 (t) = (1  rt) [pt   z0 (t+1)] = (1  rt)2 > 0
Fix N; 1 < N < 1: In period t = N   1, which is the period that preceeds
the no production period, rN 1 = pN 1 and 0 (N ) = 0: As a result, pN 1 =
rN 1 = 12 ; and 
0 (N 1) = 14 :
For an arbitrary t; 0  t  N 2; rt > pt = 1 rt+z0 (t+1), which implies
that rt > 12 : Hence, 
0 (t) < 14 :
Suppose that in period 0 the rm nds it optimal to follow option N; 1 >
N > 1: This implies that in period N   1 option 1 is preferred to option N:
That is,
1 (N 1)  N (N 1)
where N 1 < 1: Then since 14 =
d1(N 1)
dN 1
> d
N (N 1)
dN 1
; it must be the
case that:
1 (1)  N (1)
And we reach a contradiction. Therefore, at 0 = 1; the only optimal options
for the rm are N = 1; and N =1:
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8.4 Proof of Result 1
A type I equilibrium exists if and only if the following conditions hold:
(i) 1 () = 1 (1), which is equivalent to  = FAm:
(ii)   rm
(iii) The rm does not have incentives to deviate for any t:
Condition (i) indicates that at t =  the rm is indi¤erent between produc-
ing and not producing. Condition (ii) means that along the equilibrium path
the lowest value of  is 1 = 1  (1  ) (1  rm) ; and 1 cannot be lower than
: Conditions (i) and (ii) together imply that F  rmAm = 0:0919:
Let us now consider possible deviations. If t  , the optimal deviation
may consist of setting a price equal to 12 or equal to p (t) : If p (t) is higher
than 12 ; then the optimal deviation will consist of setting a price equal to
1
2 (such
a price will be interpreted by consumers as signaling that the next production
period is two periods away). However, if p (t) is lower than 12 ; then the optimal
deviation price is slightly below p (t), in order to signal that in the next period
there will be no production.
Note that p (1) =     = AmF     12 if and only if F  0:0863.
But in this case, it is clear that the rm has incentives to deviate at t = 1;
since it makes
1
4 F
1 2  1Am(1 )   F1  : In fact, the last inequality holds for any
F  0:0502 = Fm: Thus, a necessary condition for the existence of a type I
equilibrium is that F < 0:0863:
If F < 0:0863 at t = 1, whenver the rm deviates, then it sets pt = p (1).
Such a deviation will not be protable whenever the following condition holds:
p (1) [1  p (1)]  F
1  2 
1
(1  )Am  
F
1  
Since p (1) = AmF  , and if we take the limit of  going to 1; then this
condition becomes F  0:0669:
Incentives to deviate are weaker if t < 1: Along the equilibrium path
d1(0)
d0
= 1Am : If the rm deviates in period 0; then 2 = 1; hence the expected
prots in case of a deviation can be written as D (0) = 0p (0) [1  p (0)]+
21 (1) : Therefore, d
D(0)
d0
= p (0)
2   2 (1 ) p (0) + 1  > 14 > 1Am :
8.5 Poof of Result 2
Suppose that t 2 [; 1] : If consumers expect that in the next period t+1  
then their optimal consumption decision is rt = pt. The condition that sup-
ports these believes, given consumersbehavior, is 1   (1  pt)t  . That
is, pt  1   1 t : On the contrary, if pt > 1  
1 
t
then consumers will
rationally expect that either t+1 2 (; ) or t+1 2 [; 1] : In the former
case, the optimal consumer strategy is rt = pt + 116 ; and the condition is
pt 2

1  1 t ; 1516   1 t

: Finally, if pt  1516   1 t then the optimal cosumer
strategy is r = 18 + pt:
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Suppose that t 2 [0; ) : If consumers expect that in the next period t+1 
 then their optimal consumption behavior is r = 18 + pt: The condition that
supports these believes, given consumers behavior, is 1     78   ptt  :
That is, pt  78   1 t : On the contrary, if pt < 78   1 t then consumers will
expect that either t+1 2 (; ) or that t+1 2 [0; ] : In the former case,
the optimal consumer strategy is rt = pt + 116 ; and the associated condition is
pt 2

15
16   1 t ; 78   1 t

: Finally, if pt  1516   1 t then the optimal consumer
strategy is rt = pt.
If t 2 (; ) the rm plays t = 1 and pt = 58 ; expecting that t+1  :
Consumers will share the same expectations if 58  78   1 t ; that is, 1 t  14 :
Hence,   45 :
If t 2 [; 1], the rm plays t = 1 and pt = 12 ; expecting that t+1  :
Consumers will share the same expectations if 12  1   1 t ; that is,
1 
t
 12 :
This implies that   1  2 :
Finally, we have to check that the rm does not have incentives to deviate:
If t 2 (; ) ; the rm obtains an equilibrium payo¤ of:
t
1
4
5
8
  F + 

1  1
4
t

1
4
  F + 31 (1)
If instead the rm chooses not to produce then it gets 1 (1) : At t = 
the rm must be indi¤erent between these two options. Hence,
 =
32
3
F
The widest range of parameters that sustain a type II equilibrium is  = 45 ;
which implies that   35 . Since  mult lie in the interval

3
5 ;
4
5

then a type II
equilibrium exist only if F 2 [0:0562; 0:0750] :
Still in the case t 2 (; ) ; the rm could consider a price in the range
15
16   1 t ; 78   15t

and face a consumer behavior described by rt = pt + 116 :
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